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rights. More than one writer has pointed out that the liberal construetions of the Fourth during the twenties were due in some part to the
general unpopularity of the Volstead Act.28 In view of the growing
probability of some sort of federal anti-sedition law cnacted in the
heat of the moment such a rule would be of obvious benefit in curbing
a too zealous enforcement.
Former Court majorities have apparently felt that the cost of letting
a few offenders go free was not too great in exchange for the hope
of a proper observance of the Constitutional dictates in the future.
As Mr. Justice Holmes said, "We have to chose, and for my part I
think it a less evil that some criminal should escape than that the
Government should play an ignoble part.''29 While this attitude
prevailed the Court could easily adhere to its body of precedent in
determining which searches were "reasonable" and which were not
without qualms about the legal consequences that followed. The present tendency, however, to sustain an obviously just conviction and
yet accord civil liberties the respect they have been paid in the past
(by retention of the exclusionary rule) produces an obvious conflict.
The way out that the Court has chosen is to expand the concept of a
"reasonable search" and in effect to decrease the scope of protection
afforded the individual. 30 In most state jurisdictions where the exclusionary rule does not obtain the police conduct herein reviewed
would probably be condemned, and although the evidence seized would
be allowed, the resulting civil liability of the offending officers would
perhaps be some deterrent against similar conduct in the future. The
disposition of the present Court to absolve the officers completely would
remove even that illusory remedy. Therefore, it may well happen that
by allowing more and more questionable police tactics to go unreproved the Court will achieve the anomalous result of actually affording less protection to the individual's right of privacy than is shown
in those states which have never interpreted their constitutional search
and seizure provisions so liberally.
WARREN PHILLIP HILL.

The Inspection of State's Evidence by a Defendant in Advance
of Trial
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in the recent case of State v. Haas,'
had occasion to reaffirm the existence of a discretionary power in trial
courts to compel the production of state's evidence in advance of trial
for the benefit of accused persons. The defendants were subjected to
questioning by the police department of Baltimore and denied the right
to communicate with counsel. When they were able to enforce the
latter right through writs of habeas corpus, they requested an order of
court directing the prosecution to furnish them copies of statements
28 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) Vol. 7 §2184, p. 34; Grant, Circumventing
the Fourth Amendment (1944), 14 So. Ca]if. L. Rev. 359; Atkinson, Prohibition
and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case (1925), 59 Am. L. Rev. 728; Comment (1940)
25 Marquette L. Rev. 13; and see remarks by Bourquin, J. in United States v. Rogers,
53 F. (2d) 874 (D.C. N.D., N.J., 1931).
29 See dissenting opinion, Olnstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
30 Comment (1943) 42 Mich. L. Rev. 147.
1 ....Md..
51 A. (2d) 647 (1947).
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made by them to the police during the period of arrest. The trial court
allowed the petition hut stayed execution of its order pending appeal
by the siate. Although the Court of Appeals was of the opinion
that it lacked jurisdiction under Maryland procedures to grant certiorari for review of a preliminary order 2, it nevertheless decided to state
its views for the guidance of trial judges because of the great public
interest in the determination of the issue and the moot 3nature of the
problem once there had been a compliance with the order.
The only question presented was as to the authority of the trial
court to make the order allowing inspection. 4 The state took the position that since there had been no such authority at common law5 the
court was historically precluded from finding a judicial source of power.
In other words, any such authority must be created by an act of legislature.
Although at common law there was no inspection, either in civil or
in criminal cases, equity early gave some remedy in civil suits for the
elicitation of facts through inquiry 6. For the most part the rules
relating to inspection in civil suits are now governed by statute 7. But
in criminal proceedings these statutes -have hitherto been available only
2 Contra: State ex rel. Robertson v. Steele, 117 Minn. 384, 135 N.W. 1128 (1912)
(certiorari may be taken from interlocutory order where no appeal lies upon final
judgment); State ex rel. Wagner v. Circuit Court of Minnehaha, 60 S.D. 115, 244
N.W. 100(1931); of. People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court of New York, 245
N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927) (procedure providing writ of prohibition); State
ex rel. Page v. Terte, 324 Mo. 925, 25 S.W. (2d) 459 (1930).
3 The question can arise under two situations: (1) Upon a refusal of the trial
court to allow inspection, conviction, and appeal by the defendant citing such refusal as error; (2) upon appeal by the state from the preliminary order granting
the application, procedures admitting, supra note 2. Under situation (1) it would
first have to be considered whether such refusal constituted an abuse of discretion,
and, if it did, whether under any facts the trial court had the power to compel
discovery. Under situation (2) the logical order of these questions is reversed, but
both are presented.

4 Unfortunately, the court limited the effect of its discussion to a discretionary
power to compel the inspection of confessions-the problem with which it was dealing
has a much larger scope and includes the inspection of all forms of evidence the
discovery of which might aid a defendant in his preparation for trial. Everything
the court says to vindicate a discretionary power over confessions is equally applicable
to other forms of evidence.
5 Discussion of what has been termed the common law rule denying any power
in trial courts to compel inspection in criminal cases begins usually with the case of
Rex v. Holland, 4 Durn. & East 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1792). The defendant, a
public officer in India, was charged with misprision. He asked to inspect a deposition
of the evidence taken against him by a committee of the East India Company. The
difficulty upon trial of meeting surprise with competent refutation, the length of time
necessary to secure witnesses, etc., was considered, but all the judges concurred in
thinking there could be no discretion. 'To assume such would be dangerous in the
extreme", Grosse, J. The rule has never found an adequate expression in this
country but in practice was probably never questioned before the latter part of the
19th century. Whatever its subsequent modifications in England, under present
English procedures it is only a legal relic. 6 Wigmore, Evidence, (3d. ed., 1940)
§ 1840 at p. 347.
6 Id. § 1857.
7

Id.

§ 1859, note 1.
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by a process of interpretation.8 Several state codes of civil procedure
have supplementary sections which make the rules of practice there set
forth applicable to criminal cases where no contrary provision has been
made.9 The question in these states has been whether these sections can
carry over the civil remedy. In the case of State ex. rel. Lemon v.
Supreme Court of New York10 , the New York Court of Appeals expressed the opinion that the sections there under consideration did
not. There were two considerations which make this result defensible:
the wording of the civil statutes which make inspection available to
either party in the action"; and the fact that the legislature might well
have clarified the matter if such an effect were intended. The Supreme
Court of South Dakota in State ex rel. Wagner v. Circuit Court of Ifin12
thought these arguments sound and conceded the inappronehaha
priateness of construing the statutes together to give a remedy, but
concluded that a power could be found "by virtue of a process of
analogy to civil procedures which has made the practice ... part of the

procedural system of the state"' 13.

It appears that the courts in going to acts of legislature to find therein the "source" of a power, or in reasoning by analogy, have done so to
4
-escape the putative force of the common law rule1 ; but "the question
is one of policy, not of power"1. Accordingly, a majority of American
8 There are now statutes making inspection discretionary in the federal courts
and in Florida. Fed. R. Crim. p. 16, "Discovery and Inspection. Upon motion of
a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or information, the court
may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and
copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents, or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant, or obtained from others by seizure or by
process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of
his defense, and that the request is reasonable. The order shall specify the time,
The rule in the form originally proplace, and manner of making the inspection."
posed read: . . . "obtained from or belonging to the defendant or constituting
evidence in the proceedin." Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Report of the
Advisory Committee (1942), 1st draft, rule 18. Fla. Stats. 1941, Ch. 909, § 909.18.
But see Williams v. State, 143 Fla. 826, 197 So. 562 (1940).
9 People v. Nields, 70 Cal. App. 191, 232 Pac. 985 (1924) (construing § 1000 of
Calif. Code Civ. Proc.); State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319, 296 S. W. 132 (1927), and
State ex rel. Page v. Terte, 324 Mo. 925, 25 S. W. (2d) 459 (1930) (both applying
§ 1378 Mo. R. S. 1919); New York ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court of New York.
245 N. Y. 24, 156 N. E. 84 (1927) (§ 324 of N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act).
'0 People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court of New York, 245 N. Y. 24, 156 N. B.
84 (1927).
11 The accused cannot, of course, be compelled to extend a similar courtesy to the
prosecution because of the privilege against self-incrimination.
12 60 S. D. 115, 244 N. W. 100 (1931).
'3 Id. at 117 and 101.
14 " But what at least ought to be clear is that the judiciary power, as exercised
by the Supreme Court is ample to grant such inspection in proper cases without waiting for a remedial statute". Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1850, p. 395. This
is not strictly accurate. In the Haas case the state contended that the civil remedy
of inspection had been given by a statute which specifically denied the power of the
court to make rules in criminal cases, and hence was conclusive of legislative intent;
but the court pointed out that rule-making powers, although not yet exercised, had
been subsequently given by § 68 A. of Article IV of the Maryland Constitution. In
State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. (2d) 273 (1946), a statute providing that
"rules of evidence and all other proceedings in the prosecution of crimes. . . should
be according to the common law. . ." was declared unconstitutional insofar as it
denied the defendant a fair trial.
15 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1850, p. 395.
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jurisdictions have recognized a discretionary power.' 6
The cases cited
by the prosecution in the Haas case as upholding the common law rule
were for the most part instances in which the question arose upon appeal
by the defendant from an adverse ruling of the trial court and represent a refusal by the upper courts to reverse for error upon this single
ground.' 7 Such a refusal is not per se inconsistent with the existence
of a discretionary power but may indicate the scope within which discretion is operative.
The arguments in favor of inspection, in principle deriving from the
desire to purge criminal justice of its adversary character' 8 , begin with
the proposition that an accused should be given every practical opportunity to prepare a defense' 9 . In theory this consideration is subserved
by the presumption of innocence. 20 In reality the attitude of fair play
still admits that a guilty man is entitled to a defense equally with an
innocent one even though the ascerthinment of truth (guilt or innocence) is the ideal to which the form of our procedures must attain.
Thus, the placing of a discretionary power in trial courts to compel
inspection in meritorious cases appears to be the most sensible method
presently available to adjust practice to obtaining conditions. The
objection sometimes raised, that to allow inspection would be to encounter
the danger of tampering with evidence by unscrupulous counsel, is no
longer given credence 21 . The more substantial fear that guilty persons
will have opportunity to falsify alibis and manufacture refutations if
inspection is made pdrmissive is, to the thinking of most courts, not
sufficient to outweigh the possibility of real prejudice which might result in unjust convictions. The danger is to a large degree minimized
by the limitations put upon the privilege, and by other procedural
16 Cases expressly postulating a discretionary power: Wendling v. Common., 143
Ky. 387, 137 S. W. 205 (1911); Common. v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 66 N. E. (2d)
814 (1946); Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 15 N. W. (2d) 323 (1944). Cases implicitly recognizing a discretionary power: State ex tel. Page v. Terte, 324 Mo. 925,
25 S. W. (2d) 459 (1930); State v. diNoi, 59 R. I. 348, 195 Atl. 497 (1937) ; State
v. Morrison, 175 Wash. 656, 27 P. (2d) 1065 (1933) and cases cited infra, note 26.
Cases assuming a discretionary power without deciding: New York ex tel. Lemon v.
Supreme Court, 245 N. Y. 24, 156 N. E. 84 (1927); People v. Nields, 70 Cal. App.
191, 232 Pac. 985 (1924).
17 People v. Bermijo, 2 Cal. (2d) 270, 40 P. (2d) 823 (1935) ; People v. Parisi,
270 Mich. 429, 259 N.W. 127 (1935) ; State v. Kupis, Del. Ct. Oyer & Ter., 179 Atl.
640 (1935). But of. State ex rel. Robertson v. Steele, 117 Minn, 384, 135 N. W.
1128 (1912). The one recent case which might have forwarded the argument of the
state in the Haas case isthat of Silliman v. People, 114 Colo. 130, 162 P. (2d) 793
(1945) (entitled to inspection of confession upon trial, "then and only then").
But see Massie v. People, 82 Colo. 205, 258 Pac. 226 (1927) (if under any circumstances motion is good, its allowance is discretionary).
IS State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319, 296 S. W. 132 (1927) ("1That it was desired
that state's evidence remain undisclosed partakes of the nature of a game rather
than judicial proceedings").
19 U. S. v. Rich, 6 Alaska Rep. 670 (1922), Daly v. Dimock, 55 Conn. 579, 12 Atl.
405 (1887). But see People ex Tel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84
(1927) (not for mere reason that it will be useful in supplying a clue whereby
evidence may be gathered). State v. diNoi, 59 R. I. 348, 195 Atl. 497 (1937).
20 Daly v. Dimock, 55 Conm 579, 12 Atl. 405 (1887), State v. Dorsey, 207 La.
928, 22 So. (2d) 273 (1945).
21 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1850, p. 395. Both the Federal and Florida
statutes provide for the manner in which inspection shall be accomplished, see supra
note 8.
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preeautions 22. The practical advantages of allowing inspection in the
discretion of the trial judge will be manifest in the time saved upon
trial: in pleading 23, presentation and inspection of evidence 2 4, and rebuttal 25.
While the existence of a discretionary power can no longer be suspect,
the recent tendency of counsel has been to argue that inspection devolved as right, not as privilege 2 6. In only one jurisdiction has this
novel augmentation to the body of rights already accorded defendants
gained acceptance 27 . In State v. Dorsey2U the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed a conviction solely upon the ground that pre-trial inspection
of a confession had been denied the defendant, and that this opportunity to inspect was included in the constitutional guarantee of a fair
trial. The court in reaching its decision was avowedly influenced by
the pre-trial procedures followed in England which it characterized
as "more civilized" than our own. It is questionable whether this one
instance of English practice should be isolated and applied out of context to a system of criminal apprehension, investigation, and prosecution unlike the environment in which it was formulated.
The courts which have not found a source of discretionary power by
29
analogy to civil procedures have by analogy found its limitations.
30
Evidence may not be inspected if it is not material, or if it is inadmissible upon trial.31 While the reasons for not allowing inspection of
evidence inadmissible upon trial are persuasive in civil suits, the limitation applied to criminal cases is not always consistent with the policy of
permitting counsel a more thorough preparation for trial. The requirement that evidence be material is meant to protect the prosecution from
22 In States in which the accused is required by statute to give notice before
trial of witnesses intended to be called, 6 Wigmore, op. cit. supra, note 5, § 1855b,
the danger may be lessened.
23 People v. Rogas, 287 N.Y.S. 1005 (1935).
(Alienists may examine statements to determine sanity at time of act.) But cf. People v. Skoyee, 50 N.Y.S. (2d)
438 (1944).
24 Reg. v. Spry & Dore, 3 Cox Cr. Cas. 221 (1848) (examination of body; obliged
to stop trial until examination made unless inspection granted).
25 Rex v. Holland, 4 Durn. & East 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1792).
See also,
cases on impeachment, infra note 42.
26 State v. Weer, 219 Ind. 217, 36 N.E. (2d) 787 (1941), State v. Cala, ... Ohio
App. ... , 35 N.E. (2d) 758 (1940) (public interest should be considered in construing a statute under which right is claimed never before accorded defendants).
27 State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. (2d) 273 (1945), Note (1946) 20 Tul.
L.R. 133.
28 Ibid.
29 People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 34, 156 N.E. 84, 85
(1927): "No precedent can be found ir civil causes for compelling disclosure in
advance of trial of the office notes or memoranda prepared by an attorney after
consultation with his client and summarizing his understanding of the testimony
that is likely or expected."
It is precisely here that the theory which predicates
the existence of a discretionary power upon civil analogy breaks down: the character
of the search and the penalties attending failure are not the same in criminal and
civil proceedings.
30 State ex rel. Page v. Terte, 324 Mo. 925, 25 S.W. (2d) 459 (1930), State v.
Hall, 55 Mont. 182, 175 Pac. 267 (1918), State v. diNoi, 59 R. L 348, 195 Atl. 497
(1937).
31 People v. Santora, 51 Cal. App. (2d) 707, 125 P. (2d) 606 (1942) (police
reports not used to refresh recollection) : cf. U. S. v. Simonds (C.C.A. N.Y.) 148 F.
(2d) 177, Common. v. Giacomazza, 311 Mass. 456, 42 N.E. (2d) 506 (1942) (confes.
sion of co-defendant).
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additional aspect of the
"fishing" expeditions ;32 often cases take on 3the
good faith of counsel in making the request. 3 In the Wagner case the
court appears to have gone furthest in converting the limitation into
mere formality when it refused to find an abuse of discretion where
if it might become
was shown to be not material, ".
the evidence
34
material".
Within these limits of materiality and admissibility the appellate
courts have been able to vary the uses of discretion permitted trial
judges from the limited prescription of the Lemon case to the wide
powers granted by the Wagner case.3 5 In the middle ground it has
been suggested that rulings will be reversed only for "manifest abuse",
-gross abuse", "that injustice may not be done".36 This language is
less helpful than an examination of the cases of a particular jurisdiction
to determine under what facts inspection has been permitted.
The type of evidence to be inspected is the most significant factor
underlying the decisions. In states in which there is no statutory provision for inspection of a kind of evidence which is at the basis of the
charge, the practice of the courts is to allow inspection, and it has even
been expressed as a "right". 3 7 Where inspection is asked of chattel
evidence not the basis of charge but material for other reasons to the
defendant's case, inspection has been allowed. 38 Where permission is
victim,
asked to examine the body or parts
3 9 of the body of a deceased
other circumstances are controlling.
In approaching the question of documentary evidence it is advisable
to distinguish between public and private documents, and particularly
and semi-official reports as
so in states which classify certain official
"public" and regulate their inspection.4 0 It has been argued, but un32 U. S. v. Warren, 53 F. Supp. 435 (D.C. Conn.) (1944) (defendant learned of
contents of package through newspapers) ; People v. Gatti, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 130 (1938),
Note (1938) 7 Ford L.R. 449.
33 People v. Skoyec, 50 N.Y.S. (2d) 438 (1938).
34 See supra note 12.
35 Op. cit. supra notes 10 and 12.
36 State v. Payne, 252 Wash. 407, 171 P. (2d) 227 (1946), U. S. v. Masuch, 30
F. Supp. 976 (S.D. N.Y.) (1939).
37 People v. Gerrold, 265 Ill. 448, 107 N.E. 165, (1916), Rex. v. Harrie, 6 Carr.
&P. 105 (1833) (threatening letter basis of charge), Cramer v. State, 45 Neb. 88, 91,
15 N.W. (2d) 323, 327 (1944): "We think that when a prosecution is based upon
a written instrument, as in a forgery case, the defendant is entitled to inspect...
If a prosecution is based upon the correctness or incorrectness of certain records,
such as is ofttimes the case in prosecutions for embezzlement, the examination of all
such records should be granted'' . . . (italics supplied). But of. People v. Masuch,
30 F. Supp. 976 (S.D. N.Y. 1939) (no inspection of testimony given before S.E.C.).
38 U. S. v. Rich, 6 Alaska Rep. 670 (1922) (inspection of fingerprints), U. S. v.
Warren, 53 F. Supp. 435 (D.C. Conn., 1944). Contra: People v. Gatti, 4 N.Y.S.
(2d) 130 (1938). Scene of crime: Andrews v. Superior Court of Maricopa, 39 Ariz.
242, 5 P. (2d) 192 (1931), People v. Johnson, 219 Cal. 72, 25 P. (2d) 408 (1933).
39 Common. v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 66 N.E. (2d) 814 (1946), Silliman v. People,
114 Colo. 130, 164 P. (2d) 793 (1945).
40 Daly v. Dimock, 55 Conn. 579, 12 Atl. 405 (1886), State v. Payne, 252 Wash.
407, 171 P. (2d) 227 (1946) (no inspection of autopsy report): State v. Herman,
219 Wise. 267, 262 N.W. 718 (1935) (no inspection of testimony in John Doe proceedings) ; State v. Strothers, 89 W. Va. 352, 109 S.W. 337 (1921); State v. Collett,
144 Ohio St. 639, 58 N.E. (2d) 417 (1944) (doctor's report).
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successfully, that notes and memoranda in the hands of a district attor4
ney, clerk of court, or other public servant ought to be so classified. '
When the initial distinction between public and non-public documents
is made, analysis becomes more simple. If the documents are stenographic notes and memoranda of the testimony of witnesses, unless
otherwise governed by statute, courts are disinclined to allow inspection
except for purposes of impeachment. 42 Where the statements of the
accused are less than an admission of guilt there would seem to be the
most likelihood of encountering the ulterior curiosity which engendered
the no-inspection policy of the common law. This accounts for the fact
that in this area courts have been most reluctant to extend the privilege. 43 If the statements go beyond mere testimony to directly implicate
the defendant and charge him by his own tongue with crime, the idea
seems to obtain that such statements, if true, will not be the less damaging if counsel is allowed to inspect and copy ;44 in such a case there are
more compelling considerations of fairness in defendant's favor e.g.,
the possibility of a forged signature or careless stenography. 45 Where
inspection is requested of other documents not the basis of charge (e.g.,
books, 46 letters, 47 private reports, etc.) lines of distinction are difficult
to draw, and the result is dependent upon the necessities of the situation.
Heretofore the burden of showing good reason why inspection should
48
In United States v. Masuch 49 it
be granted has been on the defense.
was suggested by the attorney for the accused (but not adopted by the
court) that the burden should be upon the government to show that
"irreparable damage would be done, and disclosure would prejudice or
handicap its case". 5° Such a test is not objectionable, because it is in
keeping with the modern trial practice of allowing the defense adequately
to prepare for trial without unduly handicapping the prosecution.
M. H.

JUSTAx.

'McAden v. State, 155 Fla. 523, 21 So. (2d) 33 (1945).
State v. McDonald, 342 Mo. 998, 179 S.W. (2d) 286 (1938) ; State v. Hancock,
340 Mo. 918, 104 S.W. (2d) 241 (1937) ; Currie v. State, 102 Tex. Cr. App. 653, 279
S.W. 834 (1930). Inspection for purposes of impeachment should be treated as a
distinct problem; a fortiori, the right of inspection of evidence upon trial.
43 People v. Bermijo, 2 Cal. (2d) 823, 40 P. (2d) 823 (1935); People v. Parisi,
270 Mich. 429, 259 N.W. 127 (1935).
44 People v. Rogas, 287 N.Y.S. 1005 (1935).
45 It was suggested in the Lemon case that inspection of'a confession might be
necessary where there was doubt as to the validity of the signature, or the danger of
faulty transcription. This ignores what wab well expressed in the Haas case: "On
the other hand there seems to be a measure of elemental justice in permitting one
accused of crime to see a confession alleged to have been made by him which
he expects to be produced against him at his trial". See supra note 1 at 653.
46 People v. Kuberaeki, 310 Mich. 162, 16 N.W. (2d) 703 (1944) (books and
4t
42

records of successful bidder for contract), U. S. v. Goedde & Co., 40 P. Supp. 523

(E.D. flI. 1941). See also People v. Johnson, 219 Cal. 72, 25 P. (2d) 408 (1933), Idaho
Galena Min. Co. v. Judge of District Court, 47 Idaho 195, 273 Pac. 952 (1929).
47 U. S. v. Warren, 53 F. Supp. 435 (D.C. Conn.) (1944), People v. Wargo, 268
N.Y.S. 400 (1932) (letter in Hungarian-privilege of interpretation).
48 May v. State, 129 Tex. Cr. App. 2, 83 S.W. (2d) 338 (1935), State v. diNoi,
59 R. I. 348, 195 AtI. 498 (1937), State v. Morrison, 175 Wash. 656, 27 P. (2d)

1065 (1933).
49

Cited supra note 36.

50 Id. at 978.

